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Summary 
 
 This is a study to observe influence of corporate governance phenomenon that has shed its 
light on global financial markets in recent decades. Businesses continue to provide sophisticated 
governance measures as required by regulators and stakeholders, but whether those companies actually 
demonstrate better performance and stock return are still skeptical and vary depending on markets and 
times. This study analyzes the relationship of corporate governance mechanism and stock return of 
companies in Thai stock market during financial crisis when market becomes more sensitive. 
 The interested factors consist of controlling power, disclosure, and transparency. The 
controlling power is decided by ratio of largest management ownership, which reflects the power of 
management shareholder to dominate shareholder meeting and be able to decide direction of company 
without need to consider interest of minority shareholder. Disclosure represents by board size and ratio 
of independent director. And transparency of company represents by auditing from outsider which is 
BIG4 accounting firm and availability of ADR. 
I estimated stock return applying buy-and-hold strategy spanning for 1 year in three period 
of before crisis, during crisis, and after crisis. I firstly conducted cross-sectional analysis in each period 
to explain relationship between each factors in different situation, then conducted longitude analysis 
 
 
 
using period after crisis hit as interaction dummy to further clarify relationship before and after crisis. 
 The result demonstrates positive relationship between largest management ownership and 
stock return. The company with controlling power helps maintain company performance and return, 
thus, protect firm value as whole rather than expropriate the minority shareholder. This implies that in 
Thailand during crisis incentive alignment effect relatively enhances than entrenchment effect. The 
longitude analysis demonstrates negative association of interaction terms of board size, and 
independence of board with crisis. The results further indicate that Thai markets concern efficiency of 
board of directors over disclosure and transparency. Nevertheless, auditing firms and ADR 
demonstrate no significant relationship with return during the period, signaling no consideration over 
transparency issue during this crisis. 
It, however, should not be concluded that Thai investor completely ignore corporate 
governance in term of disclosure and transparency by result of this study. Since concept of corporate 
governance mechanism regarding structure is still not widely acknowledge and continue to establish 
develope. Moreover, the crisis origin place may impact the investor’s viewpoint toward governance 
of company making the result different than 1997 Asian crisis. The additional studies to postulate 
development and behavior regarding corporate governance still should be conducted in order to gain 
explicit understanding and importance of corporate governance in Thai market. 
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Introduction 
 Corporate governance is principle that begin to develop in recent decades. The attention toward 
corporate governance piled up because high profile corporate collapsing and many financial crisis are 
usually found insufficient control and management as root cause. Corporate governance does not have 
solid definition; one of initial definitions is that it is system by which companies are directed and 
controlled (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Journal of Finance (1997) defines as ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on investment. The definition evolves 
overtime, and OECD defined it as “involving a set of relationships between a company's management, its 
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD's Principles of Governance, 2004). In general, it 
could be interpreted as rule or mechanism that reconcile roles and relationship between corporate 
stakeholders, in which could be developed from regulator or itself. And company which comply with the 
principle is more likely to be perceived as company with good corporate governance from markets.  
Investors pay attention to corporate governance to assure company’s transparency and protect 
their interests from expropriation by management or major shareholder. By investing in company with 
sufficient level of governance, it tends to generate relatively higher return than those ignoring governance. 
For instances, professionally-managed assets grew from $7 trillion to $24.4 trillion, while shares of these 
investment increased from $639 billion to $2.29 trillion during 2005-2015 (Social Investment Forum [SIF], 
2006). In Thailand before 1997, corporate governance trend grew slowly, and there was little concern over 
the topic. Even though, management and board of directors complied with regulation and actively 
performed their duties, it lacked of alternative mechanism to protect minority shareholder (Limpaphayom, 
and Connelly, 2004). After 1997, Thai regulators successfully conducted corporate governance reform 
which later had been recognized its framework and standard by World Bank as a regional leader in 
corporate governance with a relatively comprehensive framework and has achieved high levels of 
compliance in a number of key areas (World Bank’s Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, 
2013). 
Studies about corporate governance in context of corporate structure initially started in U.S. and 
European market, and the trend expand to shareholders responsibility (Fama & Jensen, Separation of 
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Ownership and Control, 1983). Corporate governance in Asia, started in Japanese and Korean market after 
East Asia crisis. In conservative view point, investors and regulators typically perceived governance in 
legal compliance aspect by observing single format of information like timely and reliability of report, 
which may limit overall understanding of corporate governance. Therefore, my research will deepen 
understanding of corporate governance in term of firm structure by analyzing the influence and 
relationship of corporate governance mechanism upon stock return, which reflected investors confident of 
future of the company. This study will further observe the existence of the impact under different 
economics condition.   
This study is conducted to find relationship between corporate governance mechanism and 
investor’s confidence toward company reflected through stock price in Thailand during economic crisis 
during 2007-2008. Within one year, Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) Index fell from its peak at 930 
down to 381. According to OECD, crisis is result of governance failure, and markets and firms should 
jointly raise governance standard in order to prevent it. However, some scholars points that, although 
governance lacking firm is likely to have higher agency cost and has lower stock price than others, the 
effect was robust only during crisis, in contrary the shortcoming would not show during normal 
circumstance (Mitton, 2002).  
The extraordinary alteration of investor’s behavior cause company with better governance 
mechanism experience less declining in stock price. Many studies support existence of the effect in crisis. 
Many scholars arguing that unfavorable environment induces managements to act on interest of agent 
rather principle, or major shareholder may try to expropriate benefit of minority shareholder; they may 
hide poor performance to secure their position, or take decision that benefit their business group rather than 
each respective company (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Picou and Rubach, 2006). Another 
reason is decreasing in confidence of information. Crisis raises sensitivity of investors; it creates situation 
that normally disclosed information is seen insufficient. A scholar stipulated that corporate governance 
indirectly create firm’s stability. However, firms are not obliged to pursue the ideal unless required by 
legislation or regulations (Iulia, 2015). Therefore, effect of insufficient governance is likely to be detected 
after the crisis hit market and legislation strongly inquire corporate governance from market players. The 
crisis also put tension in term of fund allocation. During crisis, expropriation probability might increase if 
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company finances business by relationship-based systems. The borrowing from related person may achieve 
better outcomes within environment that resources are scarce and limited, but the system suppresses price 
system making it likely to misallocate capital in wide market. While external capital comes from outsiders 
who typically have low controlling power, they particularly aware of potential risk in controlling power 
and generally maintain the fund as short term investment. As a result, this create mutually benefit to 
relationship investors and arm's length investors in normal economy, but make the business fragile to 
crisis. (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) 
According to findings, when market is on negative trend, investor’s behavior might shift rendering 
fundamental models insufficient, while previously ignored governance is more emphasized. The stock 
price reacts to announcement of governance framework with low significant level (Picou and Rubach, 
2006). Since profitability and growth and corporate governance look into different perspective in normal 
context, investors would naturally prefer model of profitability and risk management which is easier to 
logically comprehend and use the concept to estimate firm value. Thus, in normal circumstance, investors 
would seem to less rely on corporate governance. In contrary, company having corporate governance 
measure may be viewed as reliable company which has low probability to hiding information or 
expropriate minority shareholder. As result, governance could be one of factors that help comparatively 
lenient pace in price reduction during crisis.  
 This study will look into governance mechanism in term of shareholding structure and board 
structure. Corporate governance of Thai market was still under developing, along with low concern toward 
governance matter or exploiting from management group. Therefore, it is disputable whether Thai 
investors would shift their investment to firm with high governance indicators or not even during financial 
crisis. I believe it will help explain Thai market’s phenomenon and investor’s point of view toward 
markets during financial crisis, and helps market participants to be able to prepare appropriate solutions for 
such period. 
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Literature Review 
In this part, I review previous literatures to find theory and evidences regarding relationship 
between corporate governance to stock return. This will illustrate how each governance mechanism affect 
stock return and guide which appropriate governance mechanism to be applied.  
The relationship between corporate governance mechanism and stock return were proved in many 
markets and periods. There are skeptical opinions regarding contribution from governance, the same factor 
sometimes gives opposite outcome when markets or observing period is changed. Among numerous 
concerns, corporate governance issues theoretically arise because of conflict between ownership and 
management. According to Schleifer and Vishny (1997), principal-agent theory causes most of the 
discussions regarding corporate governance, since agency (management) may not act for principle 
(shareholder)’s interests leading to deteriorated firm and shareholder’s value. The idea could summarize 
into two aspects. 1. Agency risk makes investors pessimistic and unconfident to firm’s performance as they 
believe that future cash flow will be manipulated outside of their view. On the other hand, high governance 
firm creates trust and communicates its willingness via its system and effort to control and supervise 
managers, resulting in less opportunity of abusing power and take away benefit from the principle. 2. Cost 
of capital negatively related with measures of protection of shareholder rights. Therefore, better 
governance firm would have less cost of capital and have higher stock return. (La Porta et al., 2002). These 
mean better governance structure and practice lead to better performance, lower agency cost, and higher 
stock performance.  
With relationship of risk and expected return, firm with better governance, having low agency 
risk, would have lower expected rate of return providing higher firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
proved that better governed firms had higher expected future cash flow stream due to better operation. 
They suggest that one way to solve the problem is by providing appropriate monetary incentive to 
management that related to shareholder profit. When both parties share the same interest, agency issues 
could be solve via incentive alignment effect; for examples, giving equity ownership to management. 
However, after manager holds share to some extent, entrenchment effect may kick in. This is 
when management with large ownership might have enough power to control company without need to 
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consider benefit of minority stakeholders. Furthermore, they might already have sufficient wealth, so they 
do not intend to maximize profit but increase their utility from other aspects like maximizing market share 
or try to technological leadership (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
Incentive alignment theory and entrenchment theory can be put together to explain general 
relationship of management control and company performance. Incentive effect initially brings 
performance up, then entrenchment effect pushes performance down when management ownership 
surpasses certain level, making inverted U-shape relationship between performance and ownership 
concentration. The relationship has distinctive characteristic that firm performance will increase again 
when it reaches sufficiently high level of ownership concentration (Morck, Shliefer and Vishny, 1988). 
This means entrenchment effect dominates incentive effect only for medium level of ownership. For low 
levels of concentration, it is unreasonable to assume that manager is entrenched since controlling power is 
too small, while very high concentration level means almost perfect entrenched but could generate better 
return because management shareholder are significantly large group of shareholder. Therefore, 
entrenchment effect causes impact on stock return only in medium-concentration levels of ownership. 
In Thailand, it is typical that major concentrated shareholder appoints its people management 
position as most of Asian market, which is likely to cause entrenchment effect. Therefore, corporate 
governance measures such as corporate structure, disclosure, and transparency could be views by investors 
as indicators to determine company future performance and return.  
Governance and stock return in normal environment 
Originally, in emerging market of East Asia, markets and regulator did not pay much attention on 
management governance, together with, financial market’s nature that was far from perfect market 
comparing to recent days led to minority shareholder’s right had always been ignored. (La Porta et al., 
1998). The attention toward governance grew gradually. Study of scholar found that share price of 
company that announce enactment governance guidelines experience jump with immediate effect (1-4 
days) of share increase in firm with details guidelines ready for practical launching, and has delayed effect 
(8-10 days) in firm that only announce the enactment. The main reason of higher price is that investors 
believe corporate governance would help reduce agency cost by aligning interest of management and 
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shareholder (Picou and Rubach, 2006)). This implies that Asian investors begin to take corporate 
governance into consideration in recent decade. 
The prior idea suggests merit of corporate governance regardless of economic condition, which, 
however, is inconsistent with later empirical literatures that the effect was likely to be found during crisis 
when market’s sensitive greatly increases (Johnson et. al, 2000; Mitton, 2002; Iulia, 2015).  I would like to 
verify its existence in Thai market whether corporate governance exists in Thai market or not in both 
economic circumstances. I will analyze the effect before financial crisis, during crisis and after crisis in 
order to clarify whether Thai investors’ perspective varies depend on economics situation or not. Since 
Thai market is one of Eastern market with relationship-based, I believe that the stock return and 
governance indicators relationship of might be more robust during financial crisis. (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Mitton, 2002)  
H1: There is stronger relationship between governance mechanism and stock return during economic 
crisis than normal economy. 
Ownership and Controlling Power 
Controlling power is a factor that directly relates to corporate governance. The principle-agent 
issues must be solved in order to provide highest benefit to shareholders. But typical company structure 
causes conflict that management may not act for shareholder, since major shareholder usually place their 
people in management position. The management shareholder had more information and control of the 
company, so management could abuse asymmetric information and also be able to control management 
power for benefit of their group as entrenchment effect which mentioned (Morck, Shliefer and Vishny, 
1988). The drawbacks make company with certain level of management holding shareholder might be 
doubt of stagnate performance and return.  
There are various examples that support the inverted U-shape relationship of agent-principle 
effect. Thomson, Pedersen and Kvist (2006) examined large company of American and Europe which has 
assets size larger than 2 billion US dollar. They found supporting argument in Europe that value of firms 
will decrease with large group of shareholder. In contrary, there is no general evidence in US market which 
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support the idea of negative relationship in small companies and only found such relationship in company 
that largest group of ownership hold more than 10% of total shares. They interpreted that both markets 
have same view that large ownership group may expropriate minority ownership when they held over 
particular level of share with different tolerance level between US and European market.   
Another example of agency-principle issues from concentration from controlling shareholder is 
shown by study of stock repurchase. The repurchase can be view as benefit equally provided to both major 
and minority shareholder. In Japan, stock repurchase happens in undervalued company with only high or 
low controlling power structure from outside shareholder. However, medium level of controlling power, 
would not likely to perform stock repurchase. The scholars interpreted that strong monitoring structure – 
high concentration of outside shareholder- motivates optimal capital structure of companies by initiating a 
repurchase plan as a value signal. While entrenched firms structure – low concentration of outside 
shareholder - takes the same decision to maximize benefit of majority shareholder, which indirectly 
provides the same benefit to minority shareholder (Ming, and Toyohiko, 2013). Therefore, inverted U-
shaped relationship exists. 
However, another scholar studied Thai market in 1996, and found that structure of ownership with 
high management power unexpectedly encouraged positive return. He explained that management tends to 
be the founder group who understands business better. Since company performance will provide benefit to 
large management shareholder as share return, investors believe that the large management shareholder 
will endeavor to protect firm value. As result, interest of minority shareholder also was protected by them. 
In addition, this paper answers controversy about controlling power between Thai firms that listed 
company in Thai markets actually does not have significant different between controlling right and cash 
flow right. He tested the ownership structure of listed firm in Thailand and found counterargument that the 
discrepancy between rights is low. Although Thai companies have high concentration of ownership and are 
mainly family groups with 70% of those involving in management position, they has low percentage of 
crossholding or pyramid structure with total of 21% of total number (Wiwattakantang, 2001). 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) further explained this situation that company with founder as CEO 
could increase firm value, since the founder knows business from the basis and very shareholder have 
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confident on the founder. But value of company will decrease when transfer the power or position to 
relative due to lacking of confident while the management ownership group will try to protect its own 
interest, this argument also include the situation where there is dispute between management and 
shareholder. 
Disclosure: Board of Directors 
In recent decades, global market regulators encourage firms to comprehend and conduct corporate 
governance reform through board of directors to assure sufficient shareholder’s benefit protection. Many 
studies suggested that board of directors in business should have certain appropriate size. The oversized 
board of directors might diminish performance rather than improving monitoring and supervising 
efficiency, especially when board size consists of more than 7-8 people. Large number of board of 
directors reduce efficiency of board of directors meeting, since it needs more time to comprehend and 
analyze business or review management performance. The board size further causes agency problem of 
free-riding, since directors may feel less responsibility to do their job thinking the others might do it when 
they are in large size board of directors. Independent directors also underperform when encounter 
complicate problems because they lack of deep knowledge in business. These two issues create 
opportunity for management be able to take control of company reducing firm value. Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Jensen (1993)  
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) discussed two main sources of board-size effect. 1. Size 
increases issues of communication and coordination as group size increases, and 2. Size decreases ability 
of the board to control management, leading to agency problems from separation of management and 
control. Firms with large boards can make coordination, communication, and decision more troubled than 
smaller groups. However, the reason that investors cannot expected firm to eliminate impaired 
communication and coordination by adjust board size is that larger boards lead to less discussion of 
managerial performance and to reduce the board’s ability to resist CEO control. The scholar provides 
additional reason that firm with small board size tends to have better performance and financial ratio, since 
CEO acquire higher incentive and more encourage to take more proactive decision. Since incentives are 
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generally decided by board of directors, large board means stricter measurement and requirement for the 
same level of incentives (Yermack, 1995).  
These reasons imply that oversized board of directors might not be preferred for enhancing 
performance. Eventually, hidden issues within firm due to inappropriate board may create skepticism in 
supervising quality of board especially during crisis. 
Another governance issue of board of directors is structure of independent directors. In modern 
view, independence of board is one way to solve agency issue. The independent directors are selected 
outsiders who have knowledge and expertise in business field with less committed to management. This 
make them act for wealth of shareholder as whole instead of one group. They monitor and supervise 
management as one of protection mechanisms. The merit of independent directors also comes in term of 
disclosure and transparency via compliance. The outsiders are proved to readily comply with legal 
standards (Gordon, 2007). 
There are various success supporting benefit of independent directors. A group of scholar found 
that, in China, company with high ranking of independent directors tend to have higher value. The 
independent directors are likely to vote against management and company with high independence of 
board is less associated with earning management (Zhu, Ye, WuTucker, & C.Chan, 2016).  Another study 
conducted in Korea, where independent directors are required after Asian financial crisis, discovered 
significant relationship between independent directors and firm performance are strongly positive. They, 
however, found contradiction with study from US market and concluded that effect of independent 
directors might vary by board composition as well as the market nature (Choi, Park, & Yoo, 2007). 
In Thailand, a scholar also argued that, in normal situation, performance of company within 
SET1001 positively associates with disclosure and transparency. The two factors help reduce asymmetric 
information between investors and managements. And high proportion of independent directors shows 
positive effect upon ROA and stock return, since it is believed to reduce agency cost and improve 
performance. (Jiamsagul, 2007) 
                                                          
 
1 Index of Stock Market of Thailand (SET) consisted of top 100 large stocks in term of market value and 
has high liquidity. The index’s stock list is quarterly updated.  
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Another study in UK agreed that company with high ratio of independent directors experienced 
significant increase in share price after positive information announcement of independent directors, while 
the same kind of announcement of internal directors found a small insignificant increase in share price. 
This implies that investors have higher confident in disclosure from unrelated persons. The study further 
explains that investors believe that high ratio of independent director helps company take better decision 
(Dahya and McConnell, 2005).  
The studies upon independence of board composition clearly shows merit from outside director 
which could lead to higher firm value, especially from disclosure and commitment aspects. However, 
many post-crisis studies argued that not only oversized board, but independent directors may not always 
provide positive expected outcome. The counterargument actually were stated since period of introducing 
of corporate governance. The large outside independent directors, on hand of increasing disclosure and 
transparency, may hurt company performance instead. The outsiders lack deep knowledge in specific 
company; they inevitably need more time to comprehend discussion context, while having less time to 
discuss with internal directors. It becomes trading-off between disclosure and compliance quality against 
sacrificing firm performance. The finding clarifies that even if company simplified information in order to 
shorten time consumption, the independent directors still lack of depth knowledge to provide constructive 
opinion. (Lipton, & Lorsch, 1992). 
Recent study after Asian financial crisis frequently found evidence that disclosure and compliance 
alone are not sufficient to maintain firm value if independent directors fail to do their functions. A studied 
found that firm with intensely monitoring board exhibited lower excess executive compensation and low 
earnings management, but they also experienced weaker strategic advising and exhibited greater 
managerial issues having worse acquisition performance and diminished corporate innovation. This 
implies that negative managerial effects could outweigh benefits of monitoring, especially when firm is 
acquisition or innovation driven (Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011).  
There are considerably number of studies confirm the inconsistent effect of board independence. 
Mixed relationship between proportion of independent directors and firm performance are found in few 
countries, and the highest level of independent directors would not assure better performance (SyedFuzi, 
AbdulHalim, & Julizaerma, 2016). Another study proved that executive directors have a positive 
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relationship with Tobin’s Q, while external executives have negative correlation. They found that 
proportion of executive directors negatively associate with frequency and duration of meetings. Insider 
directors reduce the need for meetings because of their competence and knowledge. (Gantenbein & 
Volonté, 2011) 
Transparency: Auditor and ADR 
Return of listed firm also has been influenced by investor’s confidence over its transparency and 
reliability of firm’s report. Auditor is one factor that had been proved to contribute to quality of firm report 
and directly impact firm value. The value from auditing firm is more obvious in the famous BIG4 group. 
Since they continue to provide high quality auditing, investors have confident the group. The reputation 
increases the group value distinguishing them from other auditing firms, so they have lower commitment 
to act for client interests comparing to maintaining the group reputation. This makes BIG4 less likely to 
intentionally falsify or provide report in favor of client. The value of reputation was proved by a study 
upon case of Anderson, Enron’s auditor, and one of firm in the auditing group. Aside from decreasing in 
stock price of Anderson’s clients, those of other BIG62’s client also experienced unexpected price 
diminishing with lower magnitude. This is evidence that companies in the group share reputation value in 
auditing quality which help drive their stock and client’s stock higher than those using auditors outside the 
group (Asthana, Balsam, & Krishnan, 2003).   
Another scholar supported BIG4 argument that company using BIG4 as auditor tends to have 
higher quality of report than those using firm outside the group. They stipulated that BIG4 group has 
higher chance to response to investor protection principle, and has higher chance to report negative 
performance. They also found fewer frequency of earning management in customer’s report that used 
BIG4. However, in country where investor protection regime is weak, they found controversial result; 
there was no difference in reporting quality between companies using BIG4 and those using other 
accounting firms. Since there is no tangible benefit performing higher quality reporting, BIG4 may only 
                                                          
 
2 BIG 6 is a group of famous auditing firms during 1989-1998 consisting of Arthur Anderson, Cooper & 
Lyband, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse.  
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comply with regulation with low effort given to enhance report quality as done in developed markets 
(Francis, & Wang, 2006).  
According to notions above, BIG4’s value significantly tied with the group reputation with limitation 
of effect respect to development of markets and environment.  
Governance and stock return in crisis environment 
The concern over contribution of corporate governance begin after financial crisis of 1997–1998. 
A scholar argued that country-specific measures of corporate governance showed higher explanatory 
power regarding stock price reduction and currency depreciation than standard macroeconomics measures. 
The expropriation from management group frequently occurs in market where economics prospect is 
worse with weak governance concern like East Asia in that time (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 
2000). 
Prospect theory helps explain the reason of changing in investors’ behavior. By applying the 
model to crisis environment, a study found that when the shock hit financial market, investor’s behavior 
becomes more risk-averse trying to avoid investment loss as much as possible, resulting in excessive 
reaction to negative information than normal environment (Fox, Fox, & Gilson, 2015). The behaviors are 
describe as follow. 1. Investors may rely more on external sources of information, which might be 
disclosed by similar companies, financial analyst, and fragment of information within market. 2. Crisis 
creates uncertainty as to what factors are accurate and reliable for valuation; because of uncertainty, a 
broader range of ordinary information may be seen questionable. These make markets sensitive to 
information; it may take a piece of news from one firm as information that could be applied to others 
companies or whole markets. Consequently, whole financial markets become weaker against bad news in 
comparison to normal situation. Although external information can be useful indicator to determine 
company’s future, it also exposes company to wide range of interpretation. And overly listen to every 
small pieces of information might cause unnecessarily volatile market, since unreliable sources might also 
be taken into consideration.  
The same research team suggested another possibility that causes volatility in markets. With less 
convincing confident level, the crisis may reveal firms with fraudulent or inept managers who had masked 
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their problems in the preceding good times. Therefore, the crisis inject more severity to the business 
performance without management preparation lead to uncover of poor performance and ended up with 
large fall in share prices. (Fox, Fox, & Gilson, 2014) 
Management Ownership and Controlling Power 
During financial crisis, controlling structure of company is often one of factors that have been 
discussed over effect upon performance and return, since shareholder having concentrated ownership with 
management power could easily abuse their authority protecting their own interest when the group hold 
larger portion of shareholding. Firms with higher outsider ownership concentration, low ratio of holding 
from one group of shareholder, generally showed better stock price performance during 1997 crisis 
(Mitton, 2002). The scholar argued that investors paid attention to governance because of 2 reasons. 1. 
Expropriation of minority shareholders might become more severe during a crisis when expected return on 
investment falls. One large group of shareholder may take decision that benefit the group rather than total 
shareholder. 2. Crisis forces investors to recognize that lacking in corporate governance could harm their 
assets, thus, transfers their assets away from firm with such tendency.  
A scholar team supported that the expropriation from largest shareholder group protecting their 
own interests would be explicit only during crisis. They found no evidence of decreasing firm value due to 
expropriation in pre-crisis period, but found relatively lower return relationship during crisis. (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Another scholar argued that the diminish return occurred only in some kinds of structure, 
which unaffiliated foreign investor concentration suffered less deteriorating stock performance during the 
financial crisis of 1997. The explanation consist with empirical study that chaebol firms – Korean 
conglomerate company structure which hold under same group of shareholders - experienced a large drop 
in the value of their equity due to their movement of assets to support poor affiliate companies. (Baek et 
al., 2004). The scholars argued that only chabol groups with affiliated ownership found larger drop in share 
price implying views of investors that firm with large related controlling group might have higher agency 
issues than firm with smaller related controlling structure (Baek, Kang and Park, 2001). 
Another study, however, found contradict argument that Japanese company with high 
concentration from outsider foreign holding experienced larger fall than local holding structure during 
2007. The phenomenon was found strongly in firm given stock option incentive. The scholar explain that 
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the cause was drawback from incentive encouraging aggressive decision, moreover, foreign shareholder 
tends to shift funds back to home countries or securities with lower risk. This result can be interpreted that 
internal shareholding structure may act as governance mechanism help suppresses overly aggressive 
investment as well as indicators of company’s fund stability during financial crisis (Akinori Tomohara, 
2011). The same merit of management shareholding also found in China. Management ownership 
concentration associates in U-shape with stock return; firm with extremely small or extremely large 
proportion of management concentration demonstrated less deteriorate in performance comparing to firm 
with medium level. The scholars stipulated that management ownership help mitigate expropriation, 
especially state-owned enterprise. (Liu, Uchida, & Yang, 2012). This indicates that management 
ownership concentration could increase incentive alignment effect reducing expropriation during crisis. 
Besides, it should be note that expropriate by abusing power may be only highly occur in 
particular situation when there is discrepancy between of cash flow right and voting right. Claessens et al. 
(2000) found that, in East Asia, voting rights is higher than cash flow rights which imply that management 
can easily conceal unfavorable information or take action that benefit family ownership. By using cross-
holding between companies of family members, the company obtains higher management power than cash 
flow right from share in hand making the family group to take control and manage in a way that benefit 
management ownership rather than each company’s shareholder 
From contradictory arguments regarding ownership structure, I believed that highly concentrated 
firm would reduce firm value due to loose governance measure and control resulting in expropriation like 
evidence of East Asia 1997 (Mitton, 2002). Fundamentally, we shall concern disparity between cash flow 
rights and control right, however, it already been proved that there is low level of pyramid-holding or cross 
holding in Thailand (Wiwttanakantan, 2001). Therefore, exploiting management through the disparity is 
not likely to occur in Thailand. I presumed that there would be inverted U-shape relationship between 
return and level of largest concentration shareholder due to stronger entrenchment effect in the period. This 
goes in accordance with majority of earlier mentioned literatures that shareholder with management power 
will expropriate minority shareholder during crisis after management ownership hold over certain level of 
share. 
H2: Relationship between largest management shareholder ratio and return of stock is inverted U-shape. 
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Disclosure: Board of Directors Structure  
According to mentioned principle during normal economic condition board size might associate 
with stock return in inverted U-shape relationship because of balancing between efficiency, coordination, 
and responsiveness. A certain size of board of directors drives company to acquire highest performance, 
while undersized or oversized board might lessen efficiency and company’s share price. During crisis, 
board of directors may arguably be able to help firm maintain performance. Against unstable period, 
inappropriate structure may visibly decrease firm value due to abrupt changing in investor’s view over 
nature and characteristic of suitable board function.  
The importance of independent directors gains skeptical prospect during crisis. Even though it has 
been acknowledged of improving disclosure and compliance level, its contribution to stock return is still 
widely discussed. In Asia, A scholar found relationship between various governance mechanisms and 
return, but independent director variable is one of few factor that exhibit insignificant level of relationship 
(Mitton, 2002). Furthermore, negative aspects of lacking in performance of independent directors is found 
in banking sector. After crisis, large international banks focus on increasing board independence partly 
exhibited increases capitalization and decreases portfolio risk. The preferable result mostly limited to 
banks benefiting from a government bailout. Board independence of most large international banks were 
proved unable to contribute to safeguarding the interests of bank creditors by constraining bank risk-
taking. (Vallascas, Mollah, & Keasey, 2017) 
In my opinion, influence of board size and independent director to company performance could be 
view as traded-off between efficiency of monitoring and supervising from large number of people and 
independent commitment versus drawback from cooperation and lacking of knowledge due to larger 
number and outsider. I assume that company in Thai market should also have particular appropriate board 
size as well as level of independence depending on business and environment. Nevertheless, I believe the 
effect of board governance might be more robust during crisis because of changing in environment causing 
adjusting in and investor’s behavior and nature board’s contribution. I expected relationship between stock 
return and these two factors to be inverted U-shape, since markets becomes more sensitive putting more 
trust in company with higher disclosure level rather than continue to focus in mere performance. 
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H3: Relationship between number of people in board of directors and return of stock is inverted U-shape. 
H4: Relationship between independent board of directors ratio and return of stock is inverted U-shape 
Transparency: Auditor and ADR 
In term of transparency, BIG43 factor were empirically found exhibiting positive association to 
return during crisis period in East Asian markets with no significant contribution in normal circumstance 
(Mitton, 2002). This proved the significance of BIG4 as corporate governance measure when market 
become more sensitive. The transparency provided by the group acts as disclosure mechanism that affect 
return of stock during economics crisis. This makes BIG4’s clients experienced less negative impact from 
crisis.  The study interpreted that group helps clients gain confidence from investor during crisis because 
the group represented quality and reliable report. Aside from expertise and quality, BIG4 group has value 
in its name, which they avoid risk of losing the long-created value inducing them have less chance to 
overlook mistake or helps clients fabricating report (Asthana, Balsam, & Krishnan, 2003). These reason 
make BIG4 become one of governance mechanism, and its clients’ stock price may be able to withstand 
crisis more than client of auditor outside the group. 
Mitton (2002) also suggested the same principle to apply to company which had American 
Depositary Receipt (ADR4). By having ADR, this means some of company’s shares are hold by US bank 
for trading in US market. It implies that the company passed transparency check from US financial 
institution. Therefore, investor views ADR as mechanism indicating better transparency, and firms with 
ADR were proved to be able to generate better stock return during crisis.  
In this research, I predict that positive influences from BIG4 and ADR to stock return become 
robust when market become more sensitivity during crisis. Nevertheless, Thai market condition may 
mitigate the effect of these measures. Since regime strictness and investors’ demand for transparency in the 
                                                          
 
3 BIG4 previously was BIG6 group consisted of 6 firms as applied in literature review’s paper, but the 
group later became smaller due to bankruptcy and merging between each other. 
4 American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a certificate issued by US bank representing a number of share of 
foreign company that allowed to trade that specified number of share on U.S. market. The share is traded 
in US dollar and clear using US settlement systems. The criteria to be listed as ADR is that US bank 
should purchase foreign share which subject to reporting requirement under Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934.   
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observed markets significantly act as encouraging factors for auditing firm, the auditing firm may not fully 
perform in regime weakened country including BIG4 (Francis and Wang (2006)  
H5: Relationship between company using BIG4 as auditing firm and stock return is positive 
H6: Relationship between company having ADR and stock return is positive. 
Controlling Factors 
Asides from independent variables, I will include controlling factor to increase accuracy and 
explanation power by taking stock influenced factor in crisis period into account.  
Diversification 
In normal environment, each sector has its own business cycle; one sector may abruptly grow 
while another sector faces with harsh market. Therefore, saturated large companies tend to expand to other 
fields. They acquire not only profitability and growth in the new area, but also stability of overall corporate 
as whole due to various business cycle of different sectors. Even if one sector experiences down turn, the 
corporate will be able to survive by cash flow from other sectors. However, by having various type of 
businesses during depression when all sectors stagnate, this may lead to unexpected worse outcome.   
One scholar argued that company with highly diversified businesses tend to have worse stock 
return performance comparing to company in the same sector with lower diversification. Moreover, the 
effect in emerging country market is more vivid than that in developed market. The study explains that 
major shareholder might assign person with close relationship into management level. This leads to 
management shareholder try to secure both management position and to maintain stock price at their 
favorable level instead of striving for highest return in each business or close down the underperform 
business. As result, diversification cause excessively negative return during financial crisis. The finding 
indicates that within extraordinary period like depression, diversification may show opposite effect than 
usual stable return (Bae, Lim, and Wei, 2003). 
Mitton (2002) discovered the same outcome that large conglomerate company with highly 
diversified businesses might transfer its resources from one business to help others during crisis. He 
pointed that company with focused business provide higher stock return than diversified business on 
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average of 7.6% during the depression. This reflects that company with focused business needs less 
resources to cope with crisis, while diversified business might face resource allocation problems and lose 
investors confident due to slow decision. This phenomenon arises specifically during financial crisis that 
performance of all businesses are worse than predicted, and manager was pressured to expropriate minority 
shareholder of some businesses in order to keep poorly performed business away from bankruptcy.  
Other supportive evidences regarding firm value deteriorating due to diversification are widely 
found. In US markets during 1993-1997, manager of diversified company often expand business to 
underperform sectors; the effect have stronger impact when the manager have more opportunity to invest 
to various field of businesses (Rajan, Servaes & Zingales, 2000). Another study explained that 
diversification of risk by investing in wide area of business will not work in crisis period, since it will 
cause transferring of wealth from healthy business to business that encounter problems (Berger & Ofek, 
1995).  
However, there are some challenges arguing that most of negative results might root from 
inappropriate of view or model. Anderson et. al. (1998) stipulated that governance issue regarding 
diversifying has no relation to reduction in firm value. He accused that highly diversified firms have lower 
performance-based compensation to management level and always had large board sizes. He concluded 
that these two characteristics reduce firm value rather than diversification itself. This means lacking of 
enthusiasm to improve performance, and oversized board create higher agency cost. 
 Anyhow, contradict evidences observed in large timespan, which might be more suitable in 
normal environments. I believe negative influence of diversification is more likely to be found in this study 
which observes in crisis environment. 
Size 
There are numerous evidences suggest that size associate with stock return; small size company 
tends to have higher return in normal economy. For instances, according to Fama and French three factors 
model which is an expanded from capital assets pricing model (CAPM), size of companies and market-to-
book ratio may take in for stock price estimation. Their study of NYSE in 1995 discovered that crude 
estimates of market and size had relation with return. 
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However, the situation may change after crisis hit markets. A scholar argued that size of assets 
still has direct influence with return even during crisis. Large firm tends to be able to withstand crisis better 
than smaller firm due to various reasons; for examples, it gains easier access to external source of finance, 
it has lower asymmetric information, it is more established and well-managed than small firm, and it can 
use a part of assets as collateral. These suggest small might turn significantly vulnerable and underperform 
when crisis occurs (Baek, Kang, & Park, 2001).  
Another scholar offered mixed opinion upon size suggesting that firm size has relationship with 
disclosure. Large firms are more likely to have large number of board of directors and the size will 
determine level of disclosure. As result, better disclose quality might be found due to large number of 
observers. However, the result showed significantly difference only in the largest one-fifth group, no 
trends are present in the rest group (Webb, Cohen, Nath and Wood, 2007). 
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Research Methodology 
This research use data from companies listed in Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) to find 
relationship between return, using total return index (TRI), and governance mechanisms. The research will 
cover three period of before the crisis, during crisis, and after crisis starting from between October 1st 2006 
and September 30th 2009. The results will provide investor perspective toward corporate governance 
mechanism in each period. Then, by comparing the results, I will be able to answer whether the hypothesis 
of shifting of investor’s behaviors toward corporate governance stand or not when financial crisis hit 
markets.   
I exclude companies that delisted during the periods, so that data of stock return would fully 
absorb depression effect during the crisis. For independent factor regarding governance mechanism, I use 
data from annual report and disclosure data provided by Securities Commission of Thailand (SEC). If 
company lacked of any type of data governance mechanism reported in any period, the company would be 
excluded from analysis in the respective peiod. 
Time Period 
This research is conducted to find effect of corporate governance across times and change in 
investors views during crisis. The analysis of crisis period will use data during October 2007 - September 
2008, the most recent financial crisis, when SET Index experienced long slump. In addition, the research 
will observe period 1-year before and 1-year after crisis, times when SET Index did not have long negative 
trend, in order to prove hypothesis of changing in Thai investors behaviors when environment changes. 
Although observing time can be extended to crisis in 1997, the interpretation may miss off due to 
limitation of number of companies, and investor and regulator’s views that pay even less attention to 
transparency and corporate governance in that time.   
Variable Definition 
I will use percentage of return of company calculated from Total Return Index (TRI) as   
dependent variable which reflector of investor’s view toward governance. The return will becalculated 
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using buy-and-hold strategy. TRI Index is an index that include benefit such as dividend, and it covers 
change in price due to stock issued or repurchased. According to hypothesis, I expect relationship between 
stock price return and governance mechanism which reflect changing in investor value perspective of 
factor that create firm value during depression.  
 The first factor which influence stock return is controlling power which indicated through largest 
management ownership (LMO), the ratio of shares that largest group of shareholder with managing power 
had on hand. This variable is viewed as level of controlling power of management group that can dominate 
over shareholder meeting. The higher the ratio means management group can easier control the direction 
of company decision which mean entrenchment effect might further rise especially during financial crisis. 
The information is collected through annual report and disclosure through SEC system. Ratio of the largest 
group of management holding typically is specified in annual report. When the ratio was not directed 
provided, I will combine ratio of largest shareholder with managing position and ratio of those with same 
family name as the same group.   
For disclosure factors, I use 4 variables that signified transparency and reliability of company. The 
first two factors is number of board of directors (n(D)) and ratio of independent director (InDi), in which 
both reflect quality and frequency of disclosed information. Both data can be found in annual report and 
report and disclosure through SEC system. According to a study, number of directors indicate disclosure 
quality and frequency level of firm (Webb, Cohen, Nath, & Wood, 2007). The ratio of independent 
directors reflects reliable and readiness to comply rules and regulations (Dahya, & McConnell, 2005; 
Jiamsagul, 2007). While both factors indicate positive impact on disclosure, they put companies into 
agency risk in term of agency cost. On the other hand, there is counterargument suggesting that demerit 
may be more emphasized during crisis. While company needs to quickly establish strategic 
countermeasure against crisis, oversize board of directors may cause sluggish decision and outside 
directors take inefficiently long time to understand business and situation, (Lipton, & Lorsch, 1992). 
For the next two governance mechanism variables, I will use dummy variables of BIG4 and ADR 
whether or not the company have the variables in each period. The company with the variables will 
theoretically have higher governance tendency. BIG4 is independent dummy which reflects reliability of 
 23 
 
 
company’s accounting report; client of BIG4 is less likely to provide mistake or fabricated report, resulting 
in higher reliability and transparency above others. Company having ADR is interpreted as higher 
transparent company that passed transparency check comparative to US level. 
 I will use controlling factor to lessen impact from non-governance variables which contributes to 
stock movement. The first variable is level of diversification. I will use number of industries of business 
that company conducted through 2-digit SIC Code. The number of industry provide negative impacts 
during crisis, particularly highly diversified company may have relatively poor performance during 
financial crisis, since it tends to transfer resources of well-performed business to help underperformed 
business, thus, expropriates minority shareholder. This analysis will not take in the number of businesses 
of subsidiaries, since controlling power of subsidiary lays in different group of people and the possibility to 
transfer wealth between observed company and subsidiaries is likely to be low due to low pyramid holding 
and cross-holding in Thailand (Wiwattakantang, 2001). 
The second controlling factor is size of company. I will use natural logarithm of total assets of 
company as controlling variable. This method has limitation in term of assets valuation between companies 
that may cause assets estimation in financial report to have huge difference due to difference in cost-based 
evaluation. 
Methodology 
This research will use cross-sectional regression to find relationship between stock return and each 
individual independent variable. The analysis will cover each 1-year of before crisis, during crisis, and 
after crisis in order to confirm and compare the existence of effect in normal economic climate against 
crisis environment. Within each time frame, the analysis will be conducted with single factor related 
regression, and multiple regression using all factors. I will include squared term in variables that are 
predicted to have inverted U-shape relationship in hypothesis.   
Formula  
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Stock Return = constant +  α1 (LMO2) + α2 (LMO) + α3 (n(D)2) + α4 (n(D)) +  α5 (InDi2) + α6(InDi) +    α7 
(BIG4) + α8 (ADR) + α9 (IND) + α10 (Ln(TA))  
LMO = Largest management ownership ratio 
n(D)  = Number of directors in board of directors, Board size 
InDi  = Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors 
BIG4 = Dummy variable, whether company uses BIG4 group as auditor or not 
ADR  = Dummy variable, whether company has ADR traded in US or not 
IND  = Number of industries that company performs business 
Ln(TA) = Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
After cross-sectional analysis in each period, I will conduct longitude analysis applying interaction 
terms of pre- and post- crisis to make explicit understanding the relationship of governance mechanism 
factors between times. The idea is that in cross-sectional regression may show significant relationship 
between dependent and independent variables in each respective period, but it does not show the transition 
of the relationship between times. This analysis will evaluate difference in relationship by comparing 
single term variable and interaction variable. 
I will use Post Crisis Dummy (PCD) as interaction factor inferring financial crisis event. The 
interaction variables will be multiplication of each corporate governance variable and PCD. The formula is  
be as following; 
Stock Return = constant + β1 (LMO) + β2 (PCDxLMO) + β3 (n(D))  + β4 (PCDxn(D) ) + β5 (InDi) +      β6 
(PCDxInDi) 
PCD  = Dummy variable, whether the data observed after crisis hit or not. 
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Result 
Cross-sectional Analysis 
 The analysis shows some corporate governance concern over with few variables having clear 
influence over stock price during crisis. The relationship also limited within certain time period implying 
change in investors’ behavior regarding importance of governance mechanism as time change. The details 
are shown as following.  
[Insert Exhibit 1 here] 
In Exhibit 1, introducing regression before economic crisis, the result shows that all variables has 
no significant relationship with stock return regardless of combinations of factors in regression. There is no 
significant difference in correlation coefficient and p-value between single and multiple variable analysis. 
This means indicators of company’s governance does not make any different to stock return in investor’s 
point of view, and H2 – H6 are rejected in this period. This analysis can be interpreted that investors 
generally pay no attention to corporate governance mechanism during normal economic climate.  
This result is similar to previous scholars stipulated that importance of governance would not be 
recognized until crisis hit markets (Mitton, 2002). This finding provides another evidence that Thai 
markets do not consider corporate governance mechanism when global business outlook is clear.  
 The following table is regression result of data during economics crisis. 
[Insert Exhibit 2 here] 
The result shows significant associations from number of industries and sizes, the controlling 
variable. The analysis seem to give no significant relationship in all governance variables during economic 
crisis. As I use squared term of variables in order to prove inverted U-shape relationship, there is 
possibility of multicollinearity, so I apply variance inflation factor (VIF) to recheck the model. The result 
is shown in Exhibit 3. 
[Insert Exhibit 3 here]  
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 According to upper part of Exhibit 3, all three factors show high VIF signified multicollinearity 
between single term variables and square term variable. I rerun the regression using single term which its 
result is shown in bottom part of Exhibit 3. The result shows significant positive relationship between 
LMO and stock return with exceptionally high significant level, while n(D) and InDi do not show 
significant relationship with stock return. I also rerun the separated regression during time before crisis, but 
the results show no significant association from any variables. 
This means largest management ownership have positive contribution to company during 
economic crisis. The significant positive relationship is also found in LMO2 when separately run without 
LMO.  This mean multicollinearity makes LMO2 and LMO loss their significant power because the two 
compete each other for the same effect. However, there is an issue of interpret actual relationship between 
LMO and return. Since both LMO2 and LMO turn to have positive relationship with stock return, it is 
doubtful about actual shape of relationship between LMO and return. I clarify the shape of relationship 
using scattering plot as shown in Exhibit 4.  
[Insert Exhibit 4 here] 
 Both scattering plots shows positive slope with similar shape. This could interpret that relationship 
between LMO2 and return might consist only right side of U-shape curve making both separated 
regressions showed significance results. 
Therefore, LMO is found having significant positive relationship with return and H2 is accepted 
during financial crisis. This means Thai investors view that incentive alignment effect might be a dominant 
effect during crisis rather than increasing agency cost or increasing possibility of expropriation from 
management. It could be further interpret as Thai markets believe that concentrated shareholder with 
management power would provide higher benefit because they will firstly try to protect their large portion 
of share due to incentive alignment effect, thus, helping to lessen deteriorating of the company shares 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shliefer & Vishny, 1988). Another idea is that largest management 
shareholder, as founder group, might lead firm to overcome serious situation surround firm during crisis. 
Founder typically perceive knowledge and expertise in the business, so higher control from the group let 
company be able to take better response. This implies that investors may view that ability to take full 
 27 
 
 
control and timely respond from capable persons is an important factors that help maintain firm value 
during depression instead of balancing of controlling power, or management transparency. Consequently, 
firm with high controlling from ownership with management power could provide higher benefit to 
shareholder (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In addition, Thai company structure has less cross-holding or 
pyramid-holding when compare with developed markets, thus, decreases probability that management 
shareholder group would take action to protect interests of their group rather than that of individual firm. 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001) 
 H3 is rejected, since square term and single term of n(D) has no significant relationship with 
return. In order to avoid multicollinearity effect, I separately regress single term and square term of n(D) 
against stock return, which gives similar outcome as former analysis.  
The square term of n(D) has positive correlation with p-value of 0.15 indicating U-shape 
relationship between board size and return to a certain extent. However, actual relationship tends to be 
strongly negative relationship through comparatively large coefficient of n(D) than n(D)2. The analysis 
reflects that oversized board of directors may lowly participate to decrease stock return. This could be 
interpreted that a portion of investors perceive large board of directors as burden rather than improving 
supervision and transparency during economic crisis, but the actual effect from board size is still not large 
enough to cause significant change in stock return. 
H4 is rejected. The square term of InDi has negative relationship with return with insignificant p-
value of 0.16, indicating inverted U-shape relationship in low extent. Single term of InDi shows positive 
relationship with even lower significant level. Therefore, the relation between independent director and 
stock return tend to be inverted U-shape with low robustness. I separately analyze relationship of single 
term and square term of InDi against stock return, which give similar results of insignificant relationship. 
This can be interpreted that scarce or excess independent directors may lead to lower return. 
Extremely low independent director ratio clearly has been acknowledge of lower quality and fewer 
frequency of disclosure, but the high ratio also increases agency cost and lower efficiency. Independent 
directors need more times to understand business and to take appropriate decision comparing with internal 
directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; and Jensen, 1993). This reflects that a portion of Thai investors take 
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transparency and disclosure into concern during crisis, but the size is still not sufficient to cause significant 
impact to stock return. Another explanation is that investors knew that root cause of the crisis lied in US 
market, so they did not demand deep investigation on transparency and disclosure from Thai company nor 
transfer fund away from low transparency company in term of independent director. 
H5 is rejected. BIG4 has positive relationship with stock return with p-value of 0.68. The 
indifferent behavior of investors might be explained that concern on auditing quality may vary depend on 
level of regime and governance concern in each country (Francis and Wang, 2006). Following this 
explanation, it is acceptable that company using BIG4 as auditing firm did not show exceptional return 
against company using other auditing firms even during economic crisis. The reasons are that regulators of 
developing market generally did not require sophisticate disclosure measure, and market players paid less 
attention to transparency overlooking value of BIG4 reputation of auditing quality (Asthana, Balsam, & 
Krishnan, 2003).   
H6 is rejected. ADR instead has insignificant negative relationship with p-value of 0.38. Even 
though researches of Lins, Strickland, & Zenner (2000) and Mitton (2002) find that company with ADR 
tend to have positive relationship due to higher trust from US market and higher chance to acquire better 
financial source in context of 1997 crisis. The contradiction may explain by origin place of the crisis. The 
observing period of this study is 2007-2008 when US markets itself encountered problems, which lead to 
stress in its markets as well as ADR stock. The depression may induce investors to transfer fund from the 
problem markets to safe haven, in which drag down ADR stock there. Therefore, difference in origin place 
of crisis may change influence ADR upon stock return from positive effect to insignificant negative 
relationship. 
 The following table is analysis result using data of 1-year after economic crisis. 
 [Insert Exhibit 5 here] 
H3 is the only accepted hypothesis in this period from the result showing significant relationship 
between return and LMO factors. Coefficient of LMO2 is -0.8177 and that of LMO is 0.8255; p-value is 
0.0567 and 0.0168, respectively. LMO2 showed negative coefficient and LMO show positive 
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coefficients. This demonstrates inverted U-shape relationship with goes in accordance with previous 
scholars implying incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect (Morck, Shliefer and Vishny, 
1988). The whole picture of relationship between management ownership factor and return, however, stay 
positive. Since LMO variable is percentage range from 0% - 100% and coefficient of LMO2 and LMO are 
similar, the contribution from LMO factors will undoubtedly grant positive effect. This indicates lag effect 
that Thai investor continues to perceive largest ownership with management power as positive indicators 
for a certain period after crisis. The result also implies less consensus of investor’s perspective toward 
importance of LMO after a year passed, since p-value of LMO2 and LMO 1-year after crisis is lower than 
those in separated LMO regression during crisis (Exhibit 3).  
I analyzed individual effect of each factor by regressing each of them along with controlling 
variable in all observing time period in order to confirm individual relationship. The result are showed in 
first to third column in Exhibit 1-2 and 5. The results are in accordance with multiple analysis conducted in 
each respective time which LMO is significant factor.  
Longitude Analysis 
To deeper understanding, I conducted longitude analysis of interested factors in order to evaluate 
change of investor’s behavior. The analysis use single term of each factor and interaction term between 
single term variable and post crisis dummy. Even though investor’s behavior may not show obvious sign 
relationship with stock return during each observed period in cross-sectional regression, the change in 
economy may cause adjustment in slope of relationship across time.  
 [Insert Exhibit 6 here] 
The result provides additional evidence that board size and independent director ratio also 
contribute to return during economic crisis. PCDxn(D) shows significant negative relationship with return, 
while n(D) alone does not show any signal. This means larger size of board helps providing stronger return 
in normal circumstance, but harm firm value during crisis. The finding conforms to previous studies that 
board size might lessen firm value due to lacking in speed and coordination within board. Another reason 
that create negative impact especially during crisis period is that board size decreases ability of the board 
to control management. The demerit intensifies during crisis because management has higher possibility to 
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protect their own interest, but large board size hinders communication within board and may even create 
free-riding situation (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996)  
Another finding is that coefficient of PCDxInDi exhibits significant negative relationship, while 
InDi does not exhibit any signal. This means higher ratio of independent directors within board causes 
stronger negative return after crisis hit, but it the effect would not appear in normal economic climate. The 
negative influence conforms to recent study conducted after governance reform due to Asian crisis. The 
independent director ratio, implying transparency and compliance of company, unexpectedly lowered firm 
performance and return instead of gaining additional benefit through transparency. Many scholars argued 
that transparency from independence of board comes in hand of sacrificing efficiency of board of directors. 
Since independent directors should not committed to internal persons, they lack deep expertise and 
knowledge in firm, and have less time to discuss with internal directors, and need more time in meeting as 
well as hardly give constructive opinions (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash, 2011; 
Gantenbein & Volonté, 2011; Vallascas, Mollah, & Keasey, 2017). In light of corporate governance trend, 
independence of board of directors becomes overly focused, and may diminish interest of minority 
shareholder in contrast to its initial assigning objective. The crisis in Thailand might ignite view that, in 
order to protect firm value, the most crucial characteristic of board should be ability to take professional 
and timely decision rather than transparency and compliance. Nevertheless, the analysis was conducted 
using data during 2007-2009. It has limitations in term of origin place of crisis that is different than Asian 
crisis of 1997. From this point of view, the result could be explained consistently with studied of Mitton 
(2002). Independent director factor did not exhibit relationship with return during Asian crisis, but it has 
negative relationship when origin crisis place change to US markets. The disarray could be interpreted that 
disclosure and transparency is considered as negative factor in this case because it make unnecessary 
burden when problem does not stem from local markets, but become less negative when higher 
transparency is needed when crisis starts in local markets. If financial crisis begin in other regions, market 
players may perceive independent directors as hindrance to efficiency.   
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Result of longitude analysis exhibit negative relationship in board size and independent directors 
after crisis hit. This may conclude that, during financial crisis, Thai markets mainly perceive value added 
from efficiency and responsiveness rather than transparency. 
Controlling Variables 
The size of firm has negative relationship with stock price after the crisis hit, and the effect 
decrease in 1-year after crisis period. The result goes against expectation. According to scholars, large firm 
is likely to be more stable during crisis period because it could withstand the impact by utilizing various 
sources of capital. The result is similar to researches observing normal economy (Fama and French,1993; 
Senthilkumar, 2009).  Other scholars proved that size is more suitable factor helping explain return in 
cross-sectional analysis instead of Beta (Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1984; Lam, 2002). This means there is 
large possibility that severity of negative impact may increase as size increases.  The explanations for this 
study is that investors knew that the main cause did not stem from local markets, so they did not question 
company’s financial stability. Consequently, size did not play role as safeguard indicating financial 
stability during 2007 crisis, but rather maintain itself as adjusted risk factor as normal situation.   
Diversification factor has negative relationship with stock price during crisis and the relationship 
disappear 1-year after crisis. The company having larger number of businesses experienced larger drop in 
stock price during crisis comparing with company with less business. This evidence goes in accordance 
with previous studies that diversified firm exhibited lower performance, since it endeavored to protect 
every sectors by transferring fund to underperformed businesses during crisis. 
Summary of Hypothesis 
H1 is accepted because there are significant changes in relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism variables and stock return time in before and after crisis. H2 is accepted when observes stock 
market during crisis and after crisis. The significant positive influence of largest ownership with 
management power indicates alteration that Thai investor’s behavior and perception lean toward complete 
control from management group as better corporate governance after crisis hit. In additional, the longitude 
analysis exhibits significant difference regarding board size and independent director effect in time before 
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crisis and after crisis hit indicating investors put more focus on efficiency of boards rather than disclosure 
and transparency.  
Anyhow, we should keep in mind that even though corporate governance concern exists in Thai 
market especially after crisis occurs. In context of Thai market, corporate governance might be different 
than developed market, and this study provide one of evidence that stock return in SET is respond to firm 
having efficiency and timeliness capability. 
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Conclusion 
 The results prove initial hypothesis clarifying influence of corporate governance during economic 
crisis. This study enlightens comprehension on corporate governance view of Thai markets and investors. 
The markets clearly take largest management ownership into account during crisis; company with higher 
ratio exhibits better return performance than company with lower control from management ownership. 
The structure of board of director influences stock return in term of interaction relation with crisis. Both 
variables consistently convey that Thai markets have better prospect toward firm with efficiency and 
responsiveness rather than firm with better balancing of control or having high disclosure and 
transparency. Since management ownership concentration, board size and, independent director ratio could 
cause volatility to stock return, these could justify that Thai market’s behavior regarding corporate 
governance significantly changes when crisis hit the markets. 
In contrary, governance mechanism plays no important role in normal situation. Although 
interpretation of impact direction seem to have some dubiousness comparing to research observing Asian 
crisis, the study successfully confirms that investor’s behavior and views toward corporate governance 
mechanism drastically change and the governance mechanism contribute to company return after crisis hit 
Thai markets. The study ascertain that even in developing market of Thailand, where regulation and 
regime are less sophisticated, the markets already take corporate governance into account by allocating 
fund to company with higher governance mechanism when economic crisis occurs.  
This study helps market participants understand the phenomenon and importance of governance 
during crisis. Moreover, it could act as guide for company to determine ownership structure and board 
structure when it begins to foresee large scale economic crisis. For instances, management group may hold 
low concentration of share during normal situation, then adjusts to high concentrated holding of 
management group when market begin to show uncertainty signal. This may help protect stock return 
using incentive alignment effect. The company may decrease board size or lower independent director 
ratio during crisis in order to enhance efficiency and responsiveness, especially in case that the crisis starts 
from oversea.  
The influence of corporate governance in Thailand is in the beginning stage where only regulators 
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and some large firms acknowledge and adapt to the concept, while investors and small to medium firms are 
still on the passage of learning the concept, especially in context of firm’s structure. The future study 
opportunity of this topic is still widely open and could be done in order to deepen knowledge of corporate 
governance in Thailand; for examples, development of corporate governance, influence from other 
governance factors, and incentive alignment and entrenchment effect in other economic situation. 
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Figures and Tables 
Exhibit 1: Relationship between Stock Return and Corporate Governance Variable 1-year 
before Economic Crisis  
 
 Single Variable 
Multiple 
Variable 
 R Square  0.0075     0.0080      0.0069  0.014539 
 Adjusted R 
Square  
-0.0022 -   0.0017  -   0.0028  -0.00998 
Observation 413 413 413 413 
Significance F 
 
0.5457 
 
0.5097 
 
0.5832 
 
0.8198 
 
Coefficients  
(P-value) 
 constant  
-0.0915 
(0.7525) 
-   0.3729  
(0.3525) 
-   0.1384 
(0.6330)  
-0.4953 
(0.2428) 
 LMO2 
0.3695 
(0.5056) 
  
0.3807 
(0.5055) 
 LMO  
-0.2073 
(0.6482) 
  
-0.2096 
(0.6533) 
 (n(D))2   
-   0.0022 
(0.3128)  
 
-0.0020 
(0.3595) 
 n(D)   
    0.0516  
(0.3181) 
 
0.0489 
(0.3653) 
 (InDi) 2   
-   0.7221  
(0.4473) 
-0.6917 
(0.4944) 
 InDi    
    0.4306  
(0.4688) 
0.4243 
(0.4892) 
 BIG4     
-0.0311 
(0.6313) 
 ADR     
-0.2080 
(0.2694) 
 IND 
-0.0364 
(0.1945) 
-   0.0345  
(0.2205) 
-   0.0360  
(0.1999) 
-0.0311 
(0.2737) 
 Ln(TA)  
0.0192 
(0.3075) 
    0.0181 
(0.3657)  
    0.0184  
(0.3335) 
0.0250 
(0.2565) 
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Exhibit 2: Relationship between Stock Return and Corporate Governance Variable during 
Economic Crisis  
 
 Single Variable 
Multiple 
Variable 
 R Square  0.1195     0.0772      0.0830  0.1377 
 Adjusted R 
Square  
0.1109     0.0682      0.0741  0.1165 
Observation 417 417 417 417 
Significance F 
 
    0.0000  
 
    0.0000  
 
   0.0000  
 
    0.0000  
 
 
Coefficients  
 (P-value) 
 constant  
0.3169 
(0.0247) 
    0.5525  
(0.0058) 
    0.4088  
(0.0045) 
0.4816 
(0.0189) 
 LMO2 
0.1764 
(0.5156) 
  
0.2346 
(0.3977) 
 LMO  
0.1679 
(0.4497) 
  
0.1284 
(0.5706) 
 (n(D)) 2  
    0.0009  
(0.4123) 
 
0.0015 
(0.1533) 
 n(D)   
-   0.0145  
(0.5736) 
 
-0.0323 
(0.2181) 
 (InDi) 2   
-   0.6921 
(0.1448)  
-0.6840 
(0.1628) 
 InDi    
    0.2413  
(0.4161) 
0.2326 
(0.4335) 
 BIG4     
0.0130 
(0. 6793) 
 ADR     
-0.0802 
(0. 3802) 
 IND 
-0.0259 
(0.0591) 
-   0.0284  
(0.0443) 
-   0.0267  
(0.0571) 
-0.0269 
(0.0515) 
 Ln(TA)  
-0.0434 
(0.0000) 
-   0.0493  
(0.0000) 
-   0.0430  
(0.0000) 
-0.0435 
(0.0000) 
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Exhibit 3: VIF Analysis and Single-term Regression of Independent Variable during 
Economic Crisis 
 
VIF Analysis     
Standard Error     0.2930      
Observations 417     
  Coefficients Standard Error P-value STD VIF 
constant     0.4816     0.2043    0.0189    
(LMO)2     0.2346     0.2771    0.3977        0.18       11.89 
LMO     0.1284     0.2262    0.5706        0.22       11.80  
(n(D)) 2     0.0015     0.0011    0.1533       68.74       26.31  
n(D) -   0.0323     0.0262    0.2182        2.87       27.33  
(InDi) 2 -   0.6840     0.4892    0.1628        0.09        9.10  
InDi     0.2326     0.2967    0.4335        0.14        8.56  
BIG4     0.0130     0.0314    0.6793        0.50        1.19  
ADR -   0.0802     0.0913    0.3802        0.16        1.04  
IND -   0.0269     0.0138    0.0515        1.07        1.06  
Ln(TA) -   0.0435     0.0106    0.0000        1.62        1.42  
  
 
Regression Statistics 
R-squared 0.1286  0.137041 
 0.136203  
Adj. R-squared 0.1137  0.117958  0.117102  
Standard Error 0.2935  0.292778 
 0.29292  
Observations 417  417 
 417  
Significance F 0.000  0.000  0.000  
  Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
constant    0.3116     0.0323  0.494005 0.0153 0.469587 0.0217 
LMO2   0.384885 0.0000   
LMO    0.3077     0.0000    0.3114 0.0000 
n(D)2   0.001499 0.1618 0.001576 0.1418 
n(D)    0.0048     0.3930  -0.03096 0.2355 -0.03417 0.1910 
InDi2   -0.68406 0.1624 -0.68381 0.1628 
InDi -  0.1385     0.1980  0.230674 0.4369 0.23594 0.4267 
BIG4    0.0176     0.5689  0.012972 0.6795 0.013943 0.6569 
ADR -  0.0829     0.3637  -0.07604 0.4033 -0.08564 0.3472 
IND -  0.0264     0.0553  -0.02682 0.0519 -0.02703 0.0502 
Ln(TA) -  0.0455     0.0000  -0.0437 0.0000 -0.04345 0.0000 
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Exhibit 4: Scatter Plot between LMO and Return, and between LMO2 and Return 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Scatter Plot between LMO and Return
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Scatter Plot between LMO2 and Return 
 39 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Relationship between Stock Return and Corporate Governance Variable 1-year 
after Economic Crisis  
 
 Single Variable 
Multiple 
Variable 
 R Square  0.0898     0.0774      0.0770  0.0996 
 Adjusted R 
Square  
0.0809     0.0685      0.0680  0.0774 
Observation 417 417 417 417 
Significance F 
 
   0.0000  
 
   0.0000  
 
   0.0000  
 
   0.0000  
 
 
Coefficients 
(P-value) 
 constant  
-1.1275 
(0.0000) 
-   1.1312  
(0.0002) 
-   0.9950  
(0.0000) 
-1.1411 
(0.0002) 
 LMO2 
-0.9231 
(0.0271) 
  
-0.8177 
(0.0567) 
 LMO  
0.9196 
(0.0072) 
  
0.8255 
(0.0186) 
 n(D) 2  
-   0.0012  
(0.4756) 
 
-0.0004 
(0.7969) 
 n(D)   
    0.0406  
(0.2989) 
 
0.0169 
(0.6772) 
 InDi 2   
-   0.7957  
(0.2684) 
-0.3965 
(0.5991) 
 InDi    
    0.2611  
(0.5618) 
0.1064 
(0.8164) 
 BIG4     
0.0581 
(0.2318) 
 ADR     
-0.0278 
(0.8432) 
 IND 
-0.0252 
(0.2323) 
-   0.0244  
(0.2527) 
-   0.0245  
(0.2495) 
-0.0249 
(0.2424) 
 Ln(TA)  
0.0773 
(0.0000) 
    0.0693  
(0.0000) 
    0.0801 
(0.0000)  
0.0694 
(0.0000) 
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Exhibit 6: Relationship between Stock Return and Corporate Governance Variable by 
Longitude Regression Using Interaction Term  
 
Observation 1247  
Number of groups 
 
417  
 R-sq.: within   0.0394  
           between 0.0415  
           overall 0.0400  
 Coefficient P>z 
constant -0.16183 0.0320 
LMO 0.14215 0.2020 
PCD_LMO 0.07601 0.5670 
nD 0.01523 0.0250 
PCD_nD -0.01105 0.0860 
InDi 0.21122 0.1910 
PCD_InDi -0.39049 0.0340 
BIG4 -0.00081 0.9870 
PCD_BIG4 0.04707 0.4570 
ADR -0.22723 0.1470 
PCD_ADR 0.18772 0.3270 
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